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Abstract
This paper analyzes cognitive e¤ort in 6 di¤erent one-shot p-beauty
games. We use both Raven and Cognitive Reection tests to identify
subjectsabilities. We nd that the Raven test does not provide any
insight on beauty contest game playing but CRT does: subjects with
higher scores on this test are more prone to play dominant strategies.
keywords: Beauty Contest Game, Raven, Cognitive Reection
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1 Introduction
Recent papers connect individuals cognitive abilities with performance in
di¤erent games through di¤erent tests (see for instance Burnham et al., 2009;
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009; BrañasGarza, Espinosa and Rey-Biel,
2011). This paper expands on this literature using both the Raven and the
Cognitive Reection Test (CRT hereafter) to study how people play a series
of six p beauty contest games. We nd that the Raven test lacks explanatory
power, but the CRT makes a di¤erence.
An increasing amount of literature analyzes the connection between eco-
nomic behavior and cognitive abilities. Frederick (2005) shows that subjects
who score high on the CRT are more patient and more willing to take risks in
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gains. Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) show similar results for Chilean
high school students and, with a more heterogeneous sample, Dohmen et al.
(2010) also nd that cognitive abilities are related to time and risk prefer-
ences. Interestingly, Brañas-Garza, Guillen and López (2008) nd that risk
attitudes are similar across subjects with di¤erent computational abilities.
Oechssler et al. (2009) show that subjects with low scores on a cognitive test
are more likely subjected to the conjunction fallacy and to conservatism to
update probabilities. Analyzing the entries in a Travelersdilemma game,
Brañas-Garza, Guillen and Lopez (2011) nd that subjects who score better
on a GRE-type math test tend to "undercut" the rival.
Assuming rationality and common knowledge of rationality, the beauty
contest game (BCG hereafter) has a unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., play zero.
However, this equilibrium has not been observed in the laboratory setting
for the one-shot game, although players tend to the equilibrium after sev-
eral repetitions with feedback. Alternatively, the literature has considered
equilibrium strategies according to depths of levels of reasoning (cognitive
hierarchy of thinking) that better describe behavior in this game (Nagel,
1995; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004). A higher level of reasoning indicates
higher strategic behavior by subjects and the belief that rivals are also more
strategic.
Burnham et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between cognitive
abilities and choices in a Beauty Contest Game (BCG). They found that in-
dividuals with higher scores on the cognitive test choose numbers closer to the
Nash equilibrium in the one-shot BCG. They point out that this result could
be driven by the fact that subjects with lower scores have more mathematical
di¢ culties nding the equilibrium as they choose dominated numbers1. But
they also argue that this result could be related to di¤erences in predict-
ing other participantschoices (out of the equilibrium). Coricelli and Nagel
(2009) show individualsbrain activity is di¤erent when playing a BCG with
another human participant than when playing with a computer that selects
the numbers randomly. Furthermore, they nd that subjects with a higher
level of reasoning expect other participants to play strategically, while low-
level reasoning subjects choose in the belief that others will play randomly
(see Coricelli and Nagel, 2009 on the Theory of Mentalizing). According to
the Theory of Mentalizing2, Bruguier, Quartz and Bossaerts (2010) nd that
skill in predicting price changes in markets with insider correlates with scores
1Burnham et al. (2009) study a BCG with a parameter of p=1/2. Therefore, numbers
higher than 50 are dominated by 50.
2... humans detect malevolence or benevolence by online tracking of changes in their
environment (rather than, say, logical deduction about the situation at hand)(Bruguier
et al., 2010, p. 1705).
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on Eye Gazeand Heidertests of mentalizing. Interestingly, Bruguier et
al. (2010) do not nd evidence of correlation between participants ability to
predict price changes and their score in a mathematics test3.
We analyze the Raven test and the CRT as they have appealing char-
acteristics for playing the BCG. Ravens Progressive Matrices test (Raven,
Raven and Court, 2000) measures visual reasoning and analytic intelligence,
the capacity to learn from immediate experience with the problem without
rely ing on previous knowledge, and mathematical reasoning (Mills, Ablard
and Brody, 1993; Ablard and Mills, 1996). The second test is the CRT pro-
posed by Frederick (2005); a short test with only three brief questions that
can be answered in less than 3 minutes. The three items of the CRT are
designed such that the intuitive response is incorrect, but can be correctly
reconsidered through some deliberation. In this sense, the CRT measures
cognitive reectiveness or impulsiveness, respondents automatic response
versus more elaborate and deliberative thought, and is also a good indicator
of mathematical skills.
2 Experimental methods
A total of 191 subjects (74 males and 117 females) participated in the experi-
ment. The experiment was run over 8 sessions; 7 sessions with 24 participants
each and one session with 23 participants. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the old
experimental laboratory of the University of Granada, Spain. The subjects
came to the lab and played six rounds of the BCG, one round of the Raven
test and one round of the CRT in that order. Subjects were not allowed
to use pencils or paper to make calculations. Additionally, they completed
some questionnaires and performed some risk lotteries (not reported here).
2.1 Beauty Contest Game
The Beauty Contest game4 consisted of guessing an integer number between
0 and 100 (both limits included) in which the winner is the person whose
number is closest to M*(average of all chosen numbers). In contrast to
Burnham et al. (2009), we ran six di¤erent one-shot BCG where M the
known multiplier parameter takes 6 values: 1=8; 1=5; 1=3; 1=2; 2=3 and 3=4:
3Coricelli and Nagel (2009) nd a similar result.
4The original instructions are in Spanish. The instructions were provided by Rosemarie
Nagel.
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The subjects were distributed into groups of 24 individuals. The winner
of each round received 20 euros. In the event of a tie, the 20 euros were split
between those who tied. We did not provide any feedback between trials.
Information about the results of the game was provided at the payment
stage (see below). All the subjects played the di¤erent versions of the game
in the same order:
Ms by screens
screen 1: M = 2=3 screen 4: M = 1=3
screen 2: M = 1=8 screen 5: M = 1=5
screen 3: M = 3=4 screen 6: M = 1=2
Observe that we chose this particular ordering of values of M in such a
way that:
i) Participants would nd it more di¢ cult to learn as the values increase and
decrease from one game to the next.
ii) Furthermore, this design allows us to distinguish between players who
play random numbers and those thinking about their best strategy 5.
2.2 Raven & CRT tests
Originally developed by Dr. John C. Raven in 1936, Ravens Progressive
Matrices are multiple choice tests of abstract reasoning. In each test item,
a subject is asked to identify the missing item required to complete a larger
pattern (see Figure 1). In our case, subjects face 60 matrices, that is, they
make 60 choices. We calculate Raveni as the sum of correct answers, hence
Raveni 2 [0; 60] where 60 indicates that the subject correctly lled the 60
matrices.
5We did not organize the subject pool into smaller groups with di¤erent orders to keep
the large size of the pool.
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Figure 1: An example of one test item in the Ravens test
The nal score is a measure of ability for abstract analytic reasoning and
uid intelligence, that is, an ability that does not rely on knowledge or skill
acquired from experience as opposed to crystallized intelligence (see Horn
and Catell, 1966). Following Burnham et al. (2009), we expected to nd a
negative6 relation between high scores on the test and entries in the BCG.
Once the subjects nished the Raven test, they completed the CRT de-
veloped by Frederick (2005). The CRT consists of three short questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?7
6Note that there is a unique Nash equilibrium (for any of the 6 BCGs dened in this
paper) where all players play zero.
7Due to an unintended typographical error, the second question of the CRT was shown
to the participants as follows: If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 1 widget, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?. In this case, the intuitive response is
not 100, as in the original version. Since we analyze playersbehavior according to the
number of correct answers, and not their impulsiveness, this has not a signicant impact
in our results. Note that the correct answer now, 25 minutes, is a little bit more di¢ cult
to calculate. We have replicated the analysis using only questions one and three in the
CRT, and we dont nd substantial di¤erences in the results.
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3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
The three questions have an obvious incorrect answer (10, 100, and 24),
that can be easily corrected upon minimal reection. Those who arrive at
the correct answers are less impulsive and more likely to engage in reective
thinking8. In this sense, the CRT can be viewed as a combination of cognitive
capacity and the disposition for judgement and decision making (Finucane
and Guillon, 2010; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011). Toplak, West and
Stanovich (2011) put forward that the CRT captures important character-
istics of rational thinking that are not measured on other intelligence tests.
They argue that humans tend to use the simplest cognitive mechanism, which
could mean that sometime behave not fully rational. The CRT is computed
as the number of questions answered correctly. Frederick (2005) shows that
the scores are highly correlated with some other tests of analytic thinking
(such as the ACT, NFC, SAT and WPT). We predicted that subjects that
do better on this test are more likely to choose lower entries in the BCG.
Its important to mention here that the subjects completed the CRT as
the last task. Moreover, they did the test in front of a computer and without
pencils or paper to make their calculations. This may explain why the results
are, on average, not so good (128 individuals, 67% of the sample pool, did not
provide any right answers) compared to those shown in Frederick (2005)9.
Since we were interested in detecting specic subjects who are able to
solve these questions without any help this particular set-up posed no
problems for us. In this sense, our sample of subjects is a lower bound.
Moreover, our BCG is also computerized, hence this appears to be the most
"sensible" comparison. As expected, scoring on the Raven test and the CRT
are correlated (Spearmans rho  = 0:29; p  value < 0:000).
8For example, the third question is particularly interesting in our case as it requires
some recursive thinking to be solved. This could be the case for the BCG and the way to
think about it in a step-by-step reasoning procedure (see Coricelli and Nagel, 2009 for an
extensive discussion)
9Only 23% (44 out of 191) and 9% (17 out of 191) of the subjects scored 1 and 2 on
the CRT, respectively. None of the subjects responded correctly to the three questions.
Frederick (2005) reports that 33%, 28%, 23%, and 17% of the participants scored 0, 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
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3 Results
First, we explore the e¤ect of individual cognitive abilities through the BCG.
As in previous studies, just a few subjects played according to the Nash
equilibrium. For all six games, the choices range from 0 to 10010. Figure
2 shows the mean values of the subjectschoices, which were classied for
their score on the CRT (CRT=0 vs. CRT>0). It is easy to see that subjects
choices are related to their performance on the CRT.
Figure 2: Average guess by CRT
Table 1 shows a series of six Tobit models where the dependent variable
is, in each case, the individual guess, gi 2 [0; 100]. As independent variables
we used female, Raveni and CRTi. The models are presented in the same
order in which they were played. There are two salient results: i) Raven
is never signicant, and ii) CRT appears to be signicant after two trials.
After minimal experience, subjects with a positive score on the CRT behave
better11.
10The choices ranged from 0 to 99 in the rst game (M = 2=3) and in the last two
games (M = 1=5, M = 1=2).
11It is important to remark here what the Raven test captures: subjectsability to learn
from immediate experience.
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Table 1: Estimated e¤ects of cognitive abilities
2=3 1=8 3=4 1=3 1=5 1=2
female  3:09  1:98  2:45  5:11  3:84  4:78
(0:39) (0:58) (0:53) (0:11) (0:30) (0:18)
Raven  0:37  0:02 0:14  0:03 0:01 0:02
(0:20) (0:95) (0:66) (0:92) (0:96) (0:94)
CRT 2:52  2:18  4:48  6:28  8:43  4:18
(0:31) (0:38) (0:10) (0:00) (0:00) (0:09)
*(p-value)
We study also how subjects play across games. First, we analyze the
number of players who played dominated strategies and the relation to the
cognitive tests. We observe that the proportion of players that never played
a dominated strategy di¤ers according to their CRT score: 27:34% of players
with CRT = 0 versus 35:94% with CRT>0, although this di¤erence is not
signicant (p  value = 0:11, proportion unilateral test).
We compute the variable irrat (2 [0; 6]) as the number of times the subject
played dominated strategies, i.e., if guess > M 10012. We must emphasize
that it is not the same to fail in the rst game (M = 2=3) than in the
last one (M = 1=2) as the last choice is assumed to be easier. In the last
guess, subjects have already learned through the pure experience of the game
(feedback free learning; Weber, 2003). The variable exp_irrational captures
this idea. We dene exp_irrational (2 [0; 63]) as the number of times the
subject plays dominated strategies weighted by the order they were played13.
Table 2 below shows the results of estimating the e¤ect of both Raven
and CRT on rationality. We use censored Tobit regression with normal dis-
turbances models according to the values of the dependent variable.
12Note that the use of > instead of  is NOT trivial. This is because when subjects
guess the = M*100, they are not best-responding. In any case, there are very few subjects
in this extreme case.
13exp_irrat=25  irrat6 + 24  irrat5 + 23  irrat4 + 22  irrat3 + 2 irrat2 + irrat1
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Table 2: Learning across tasks
Irrat. Exp. Irrat
female  0:22  6:11
(0:49) (0:12)
Raven 0:01 0:24
(0:70) (0:44)
CRT  0:51  7:78
(0:03) (0:01)
*(p-value)
Once again we nd that Raven does not have any explanatory power.
However, CRT appears to be signicant again: subjects with positive scores
on the CRT are less prone to play dominated strategies. This is true for both
denitions of learning.
4 Concluding remarks
The BCG is an intriguing game in that only a tiny fraction of people are able
to solve it, but once the logic of the game is revealed, most people nd the
Nash equilibrium to be an obvious prediction. This paper explores if people
who are able to solve the BCG have higher cognitive abilities. We measure
intelligence using two complementary tests: the Raven and the CRT. Our
subject pool played six (incentivized) one-shot p-beauty games without any
feedback. We nd that subjects with higher scores on the CRT test are
more prone to play according to the Nash equilibrium. In sharp contrast,
the Raven test does not provide any insight on BCG playing.
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